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Abstract: The relative simplicity of IoT networks extends service vulnerabilities and possibilities to
different network failures exhibiting system weaknesses. Therefore, having a dataset with a sufficient
number of samples, labeled and with a systematic analysis, is essential in order to understand how
these networks behave and detect traffic anomalies. This work presents DAD: a complete and labeled
IoT dataset containing a reproduction of certain real-world behaviors as seen from the network.
To approximate the dataset to a real environment, the data were obtained from a physical data
center, with temperature sensors based on NFC smart passive sensor technology. Having carried
out different approaches, performing mathematical modeling using time series was finally chosen.
The virtual infrastructure necessary for the creation of the dataset is formed by five virtual machines,
a MQTT broker and four client nodes, each of them with four sensors of the refrigeration units
connected to the internal IoT network. DAD presents a seven day network activity with three
types of anomalies: duplication, interception and modification on the MQTT message, spread over
5 days. Finally, a feature description is performed, so it can be used for the application of the various
techniques of prediction or automatic classification.
Keywords: dataset; IoT; sensors
1. Introduction
The rapid eruption of new interconnected environments—smart homes and cities, cyber-physical
systems, health systems, etc.—has caused the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT).
The new environments substantially increase the number of devices that need light processors
and simple network cards. At the same time, they implement different solutions to improve system
stability, cost efficiency, fault tolerance and flexibility [1]. However, the Internet and its users are
already under continuous attack, which represents a threat to the IoT as it incorporates many restricted
devices. This fact can generate different points of view that generate new and ingenious malicious
models. The challenge is to prevent the growth of such models or at least to mitigate and limit their
impact [2].
In order to detect traffic anomalies, it is necessary to obtain a basic understanding of the
performance and behavior of IP networks. This is the reason why information needs to be collected
and processed [3].
On the one hand, supervised and unsupervised learning techniques have been incorporated
into the treatment of performance, safety and scalability problems in these types of environments.
Decision trees, random forest, neural networks and support vector machines are examples of these
kinds of techniques. On the other hand, big data analysis deals with the variety, volume and need for
processing that requires the automatic detection of problems almost in real time.
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Therefore, having a dataset with a sufficient number of samples, contextualized, analyzed and
with content annotations, is essential to understand the communications in this type of networks and
to apply the techniques mentioned above.
The aim of this work is to present DAD: a complete and labeled IoT dataset for real-world traffic
anomaly detection, with sufficient trace size, diverse anomaly scenarios and concrete feature extraction,
which can be used for the detection of traffic anomalies in IoT sensor networks by using machine
learning (https://github.com/dad-repository/dad).
The need for fast and efficient communications systems projects IoT as a new paradigm to offer
important services. In fact, IoT introduces the need for specialized standards and communication
protocols to handle typical resulting challenges. At the transport layer, TCP and UDP are the dominant
protocols for most applications. However, several message distribution functions are required,
depending on IoT application requirements. It is desirable that these functions are implemented
in interoperable, standard ways.
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol is the most widely used in IoT due to its
low overhead and power consumption. It provides the connectivity between applications and users
at one end, and network and communications at the other end. It is a publish–subscribe, extremely
simple and lightweight messaging protocol, designed for constrained devices and low-bandwidth,
high-latency or unreliable networks [4,5]. MQTT is the IoT protocol used in the scenario presented here.
1.1. Motivation
IoT environment is vulnerable to different security and privacy issues and various anomalies
and attacks, which may cause unauthorized tasks to be performed by the remote malicious users [6].
With the development of IoT technology, information insecurity will directly threaten the entire IoT
system. Thus, hackers, malicious software and viruses in the communication process might disturb
data and information integrity [7]. In other cases, anomaly traffic on an IoT network may come from a
wrong configuration, a abnormal installation or a hardware malfunction of the sensors.
The design of this scenario has been motivated by an incident that happened at the Centre for
Information and Communications Technology Research (CITIC) [8]. An initial software failure, derived
from incorrect sensor configuration in the data center, caused temperature sensors to send incorrect
data to the cooling system. The temperature of the devices was affected, causing a hardware failure,
and the entire system collapsed.
Creating a dataset from wireless sensor networks that reflects a real system, with light
communications, using alterations in IoT protocols, will allow us to improve the detection of traffic
anomalies in these environments.
1.2. Contributions of the work
The main contributions of this research are:
• How to model an IoT environment for the energy and environmental management of a data
processing center.
• Building an annotated IoT dataset that facilitates the test with supervised learning algorithms.
• Performing an IoT dataset analysis to understand the normal and abnormal traffic behavior of
the network.
1.3. Paper Organization
This work is structured as follows. The review of the literature is discussed in Section 2.
In Section 3, the scenario that was used to perform the data capture and create the dataset is
presented, as are the physical structure of the real CITIC environment that motivated the project,
both parametric and non-parametric mathematical models of the real data taken from the sensors and
the design of the virtual environment adjusted.
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Section 4 describes the dataset generation process. Once the system was implemented, controlled
modifications in the scenario were accomplished on five of the seven days of the week. This was
done with the aim of presenting different behaviors on the network, not only in certain types of
anomaly, interception, modification or duplication, but also in the case of mixing these anomalies in
the same period.
Dataset analysis and feature extraction are shown in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, the results
obtained are presented and discussed, followed by the conclusion of this document.
2. Related Work
This section is divided into three parts: a review of IoT datasets networks, and then an exploration
of the different types of analysis and extraction of characteristics carried out in most popular datasets,
to finally present the type of mathematical modeling and the statistical analysis that is usually carried
out in sensor networks.
2.1. IoT Datasets
Although IoT is an emerging technology that has grown rapidly in recent years, the number
of public datasets available for detecting traffic anomalies is limited. The datasets created from IoT
networks will be presented hereafter.
In [9], the authors present Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT Deployments (SoK), which is
an IoT network with 45 devices used for a period of ten days, involving analyzing security properties
for home IoT devices, and applying attack techniques and mitigation and stakeholders performing
attacks on the IP protocol. The communication of the components has three attack categories: protocols,
encryption and man in the middle (MITM). Twenty devices had one or more of their communication
edges be susceptible to a MITM attack. The authors developed a dataset and their analysis focuses on
a security evaluation—applying scoring rubrics to outline the weight distribution per property for
each component.
The Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) [10] designed a realistic
Bot-IoT dataset and gave a detailed description of designing the testbed configuration and simulated
IoT sensors. The environment incorporates a combination of normal and botnet traffic. The dataset
includes probing attacks, denial of service and information theft. The subscribing and publishing IoT
services is done via MQTT protocol.
Kitsuse is a plug and play network detection system with the capacity to detect attacks in different
distributions [11]. In this case one of them belongs to an IoT network, wherein they establish a set
of nine different devices connected to a Wi-Fi network and one of the cameras is infected with a real
sample of the botnet Mirai malware.
Hyunjae et al. [12] created various types of network attacks in an IoT environment. Two smart
home devices, and other devices, including some laptops or smart phones, were connected to the
same wireless network. The dataset consists of 42 raw network packet files at different time points,
containing different types of attacks: MITM (arp spoofing), DoS (SYN flooding), scan (host and port
scan), UDP/ACK/HTTP flooding and Mirai. The dataset includes a good amount of network traffic,
and one of its advantages is the number of attacks it presents.
A good dataset, necessary for validating and evaluating intrusion detection systems (IDSs),
according to Bhuyan et al. [13], should monitor the daily situation in a realistic way; the labeling of
traffic as benign or malicious must be perfectly labeled at both packet and flow levels for each piece of
traffic, while assuring the labeling of each traffic instance must be correct.
Defining the optimal set of concrete features plays an important role for detection mechanisms.
Besides, contemplating diverse sets of multistage attacks for dataset generation, allows one to go
towards recent trends in security threats, and the ratio between normal and attack traffic should be
taken into account. Among the aforementioned datasets, the first two [9,10] do not comply with
completeness and correctness in labeling. The Kitsune [11] does not have diverse attack scenarios in
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the IoT network, while the last one mentioned [12] does not exhibit realistic behavior and concrete
feature extraction. For these reasons, the construction and generation of a labeled dataset for Internet
of Things that achieves the needed requirements for our purposes, became necessary.
2.2. Dataset Feature Analysis
When a dataset is created, it is important to perform an analysis and a feature extraction.
The objective is to present the necessary information so that the communications can be understandable,
and the dataset can be used for the application of prediction techniques or automatic classification.
In the literature we found a significant number of datasets for anomaly detection systems,
with varied types of traffic and different attack scenarios, either built under a simulated or real
environment, or by combining other different datasets. This subsection aims to show the works in
which the selections of characteristics and feature extraction have been made. We selected the most used
datasets in the literature and some examples of works that use this analysis to apply various algorithms.
In the case of the datasets presented for IoT, most of them also present feature analysis.
The small number of these demonstrates the need for public datasets available for different IoT
environments [9–11].
Three of the most widely disseminated datasets for the evaluation of networks based on intrusion
detection systems and their description analysis are the KDD Cup 1999 Data [14,15], the NSL-KDD
dataset [16] and the Darpa 2000 [17], which brings improvements over their previous 1998 and 1999
versions. The KDD Cup 1999 Data contains a large number of simple connections with 41 features
and 24 types of attacks, and it was simulated under a typical LAN network used by US air forces.
They performed nine weeks of acquiring TCP data by applying DoS, R2L, U2R and probing attacks.
The NSL-KDD dataset aims to solve some inherent problems found in the KDD Cup 1999. This version
still suffers from some problems discussed with the KDD and may not be a perfect representation of
real networks due to the lack of public datasets for IDS networks. However, it has a large number of
records, allowing for various experiments and using a wide range of algorithms [18,19] .
The Darpa 2000 dataset simulates two LLdos attack scenarios (Lincoln Laboratory DDoS 1.0
and 2.0), and generates variations on the networks to present different attack scenarios. On the other
hand, McHugh [20] then raises a series of shortcomings in the named datasets, where he emphasizes
the lack of statistical evidence of similarity with typical network traffic, low traffic rates, relatively
uniform distribution of the four main categories of attack and skewed distribution of the attacked
hosts, among other things.
The project “Malware Capture Facility Project” [21], is a project whose main objective was to
generate and capture anomalous activities (botnets) with specific characteristics. The project was
responsible for analyzing, monitoring and capturing network traffic during some months of operation
on different types of traffic and includes RRD files with the history of the traffic shape, two-way Argus
flows (both the binary file and the file of text), web logs for all web traffic and a DNS report, among
other things. The tags are generated manually by a group of security experts and are added to both
the Argus files and the weblogs.
Bhuyan et al. [13] generated three different TUIDS (Tezpur university intrusion detection system)
datasets: one for intrusion, one for coordinated scanning and a TUIDS DDoS both at the packet and
stream level, with service traffic, web, email, samba, telnet, ftp and database, normal traffic of different
users and 14 types of attacks distributed in six scenarios.
In real environments, Unibs [22] presents a dataset to classify encrypted traffic using SSH.
It contains three consecutive days of traffic in business days, with 20 workstations in a local network.
Likewise, the ISCX 2012 IDS dataset [23] has been generated by physically implementing a testbed
using real devices and real traffic (SSH, HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP3 and FTP) through profiles which
mimic the behavior of users in four different scenarios of malicious traffic. The University of
Tokyo makes a dataset of traffic collected from KDD99, honeypots [24], which takes 24 significant
characteristics into account and analyzes them.
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Moustafa et al., built the UNSW-NB15 dataset [25]. This is not a IoT specific dataset, but it is
applied to IoT environments [26]. The UNSW-NB15 dataset covers a collection of a large number
of normal network traffic and malicious traffic instances. It encompasses realistic normal traffic
behavior and combines it with nine attack categories: DoS, fuzzers, analysis, backdoor, Shellcode,
worm, exploits, generic and reconnaissance [27] and its comparison with the KDD [28].
Other datasets were created or modified from the previously named ones [18,29–31]. These are
intended to exploit the number of resources of the datasets already available, merging different types
of attacks in the same dataset and this way taking advantage of the greater amount of information
contained. The use of composed or modified datasets reduces the deficiencies found and improves
feature extraction.
On the other hand, some works present the feature extraction for applications in machine
learning [18,30,32]. The N-baIoT detects botnet attacks extracting behavior snapshots of the network,
and using deep autoencoders [33].
2.3. Statistical Data Analysis
Mathematical modeling of sensors is one of the most efficient ways of knowing and predicting
their behavior. To generate a dataset in an environment that is as realistic as possible, it is necessary
to mathematically model the real environment using proven approach techniques. Many of the
techniques used in this research have already been applied to similar environments.
Nikolova et al. [34] created libraries and proposed a methodology to adjust sensor data to
specific models. They fit data to exponentials, Fourier series, Gaussian, polynomials, power series,
rationals, sum of sines and Weibull distributions, using goodness-of-fit statistics, according to the
shape and specificity of the sensor. The use of graphical and numerical measures, depending on
sensor characteristics, number of data points and analysis requirements, allow them to perform the
best. Analyzing other domains, the statistical methods used in the analysis of temperature data from
composting have generally been based on essentially linear mathematics, Student’s t-test and analysis
of variance with ANOVA. Shouhai et al. [35] realized the statistical modeling of a temperature time
series from composting with a non linear mathematical model as the basis for statistical analysis.
They realized a mathematical description of functions, such as the logistic, Gompertz, Richards and
Weibull functions, to describe the temperature time series in composting. The goodness-of-fit of the
model was evaluated using the R-squared (R2) statistic.
The assumption of Gaussianity is prevalent and fundamental to many statistical theories and
engineering applications. In wireless sensor networks (WSN), Rassol et al. [36] have used different
goodness-of-fit (GOF) tests to investigate the Gaussian characteristics of some specific data. The GOF
test represents the measure of the compatibility of a random sample with a theoretical probability
distribution function. They considered three graphical and five numerical GOF techniques to analyze
the range estimation error data.
A similar approach to this work, related to the analysis of temperature data sensor, was done by
Bhandari et al. [37]. They modeled the temperature phenomenon as a stochastic process and analyzed
it using a time series modeling framework. The time series modeling approach selected was the
autoregressive, integrated, moving average (ARIMA) model, which determines how the short-term
predictability of future temperature is affected by sampling interval and extrapolation technique.
The ARIMA models are used to forecast the remaining days of data. For each sampling rate, the
ARIMA model is trained on three days of data, and then is capable of predicting up to two hours
forward from that point.
3. Scenario
This section presents, in the first part, the structure of a network of sensors located in a real data
center, the relationship between sensors, their distribution and their location. Likewise, the second part
presents the mathematical modeling of the real data using validated statistical techniques and methods.
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The last part describes the implementation of the virtual scenario required for the construction of an
IoT sensor network.
3.1. Physical Architecture
To approximate the dataset to a real environment, data were obtained from temperature sensors
in the CITIC data center. These sensors monitor the temperatures of various elements of the datacenter
through the use of intelligent passive sensors based on NFC technology. There are three elements with
sensors: the racks, the power strips (PDU) and the refrigeration machines (InRow). We only considered
the sensors of the InRows, because the values of the rest of the sensors are static, and therefore, are
not significant. Since the positioning of the sensors is important to determining their function, the
structure of the data center is shown in Figure 1.
Rack16
InRow 15 Rack 14 InRow 13 Rack 12 Rack 11Rack 17
Rack 27 Rack 26 InRow 25
SAI




Unit Return Air Temperature (TAR)
Unit Supply Air Temperature (TAS)
Unit Entering Fluid Temperature (TFEU)
















Figure 1. Physical architecture.
NETBOTZ 1 with IP address 10.6.56.58 has five racks (11, 12, 14, 16 and 17) and NETBOTZ 2 with
IP address 10.6.56.49 has four racks (21, 22, 26 and 27). Each rack has 2 sensors, one at the back, which
is located on the side of the hot aisle, and one at the front, facing the cold aisle.
The most important elements on the system are the InRows (13, 15, 23 and 25), which are the
devices responsible for cooling the air of the data center through a liquid cooling system.
The InRows have four relevant sensors:
• Unit supply air temperature (TAS): This senses the temperature of the air coming from the
cold aisle. Normally, the temperature measured by these sensors is related to the measurement
obtained by the front sensors of the racks.
• Unit return air temperature (TAR): This senses the temperature of the air located facing the hot
aisle. The measure given by the sensor is equivalent to that measured by the rear sensors of
the racks.
• Unit entering fluid temperature (TFEU): This sensor measures the temperature of the system fluid
before the cooling process.
• Unit leaving fluid temperature (TFSU): This sensor measures the temperature of the liquid after
the cooling process.
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These sensors send data every five minutes, that is, 288 samples per hour, for a total of
4032 samples per sensor every day.
3.2. Mathematical Modeling Of the Sensors
For the analysis, a sample of 14 days sensor activity was captured. The signals obtained from
the sensors in the data center are shown in Figure 2. The behavior of the signals determines the
workload presented in the processors, since the temperature sensed depends on the machine’s














































Figure 2. Signals of the sensors in the InRows.
The purpose of this analysis is to characterize numerical data in order to understand the conceptual
model of the observed values. To perform this task, firstly, we performed a descriptive statistical
analysis of the data from the sensors.
Table 1 presents a summary of the statistics for the data by sensor and by InRow. This table shows
how the average is around 20 ◦C for the supply air sensor, 27 ◦C for the return air, 11 ◦C for entering
fluid and 15 ◦C for leaving fluid. The highest standard deviation is given by the fluid sensor that enters
with a value of around 1 ◦C. The lowest standard deviation is presented by the return air sensor.
Secondly, an analysis of the correlation between the sensors in the InRow has been made. Figure 3
displays the InRow 25 outcome, the Pearson correlation coefficient, in the upper triangle, distributions
on the diagonal and a scattered plot in the lower triangle. The correlation between the fluid sensors is
always high, as expected. There is also a small correlation between the supply temperature and the
leaving fluid temperature. However, the return air temperature is poorly correlated with the other
sensors, presenting a certain independence. The results for the other InRows are almost identical.
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Table 1. Statistical information.
Device Sensor Mean SD min max Median
INROW 13
(10.6.56.41)
TAS 20.00 0.38 18.20 20.90 19.90
TAR 27.33 0.24 26.10 28.10 27.30
TFEU 11.94 0.93 9.40 14.30 11.80
TFSU 15.89 0.79 13.90 17.80 15.80
INROW 15
(10.6.56.36)
TAS 20.00 0.42 18.00 21.20 19.90
TAR 27.20 0.25 25.10 27.90 27.20
TFEU 11.69 0.98 9.10 14.20 11.60
TFSU 15.37 0.89 13.20 17.80 15.20
INROW 23
(10.6.56.50)
TAS 20.00 0.34 18.30 20.80 20.00
TAR 26.29 0.27 25.20 27.30 26.30
TFEU 11.14 1.00 8.10 13.60 11.00
TFSU 14.95 0.88 12.80 17.40 14.80
INROW 25
(10.6.56.34)
TAS 20.00 0.37 17.90 21.10 20.10
TAR 26.79 0.22 25.70 27.60 26.80
TFEU 11.24 1.00 8.50 13.90 11.10














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Sensor distribution and correlation: InRow 25.
Parametric or non-parametric statistical methods can be used as mathematical models to estimate
the quantitative behavior of the system. For this approach, we looked for a model that allows one to
fix all the data over the same model.
A priori, taking into account Figure 3, we could assume that temperature signals follow a normal
distribution. However, we have applied several methods to determine which distribution better fits the
data. For this, we have performed different goodness-of-fit tests. To illustrate the process, the results
obtained with InRow 25 are presented.
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3.2.1. Goodness-Of-Fit
The goodness-of-fit is a statistical hypothesis test aiming to determine how well a set of observed
values fit a distribution. There are multiple methods for determining goodness-of-fit. Some of the
most popular methods used in statistics are used in this section. A first approach was made by using
normal, Weibull, lognormal and gamma distributions. For all the sensors, Kolmogorov–Smirnov and
Anderson–Darling statistics are also computed, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Goodness-of-fit statistics.
Normal Lnorm Gamma Weibull
D/An p-Value D/An p-Value D/An p-Value D/An p-Value
Unit Supply Air Temperature (TAS)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 0.15595 <2.2 × 10−16 0.15884 <2.2 × 10−16 0.1579 <2.2 × 10−16 0.12464 <2.2 × 10−16
Anderson-Darling statistic 47.257 1.44 × 10−7 49.244 1.44 × 10−7 48.562 1.44 × 10−7 51.504 1.44 × 10−7
Unit Return Air Temperature (TAR)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 0.11654 <2.2 × 10−16 0.1149 <2.2 × 10−16 0.11544 <2.2 × 10−16 0.16636 <2.2 × 10−16
Anderson-Darling statistic 45.533 1.44 × 10−7 45.228 1.44 × 10−7 45.322 1.44 × 10−7 94.882 1.44 × 10−7
Unit Entering Fluid Temperature (TFEU)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 0.082724 <2.2 × 10−16 0.075811 <2.2 × 10−16 0.075815 <2.2 × 10−16 0.10402 <2.2 × 10−16
Anderson-Darling statistic 38.602 1.44 × 10−7 35.593 1.44 × 10−7 36.201 1.44 × 10−7 53.252 1.44 × 10−7
Unit Leaving Fluid Temperature (TFSU)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 0.0888 <2.2 × 10−16 0.08 <2.2 × 10−16 0.0821 <2.2 × 10−16 0.1165 <2.2 × 10−16
Anderson-Darling statistic 41.351 1.44 × 10−7 33.063 1.44 × 10−7 35.627 1.44 × 10−7 92.955 1.44 × 10−7
However, due to the p-values obtained, the decision is to reject the null hypothesis at a significance
level of 0.05. In other words, the data do not fit the distributions considered. This is the reason why we
have tried to approximate the series of data using a time series.
3.2.2. Time Series Approximation
Anything that is examined sequentially over regular intervals of time is a time series. The aim
is to estimate how the sequence of observations will continue into the future. The idea is to find a
method to make a good fit to the selected data. We will start by applying simple linear regressions;
then, an exponential smoothing and filter function; and subsequently, ARIMA methods to finally make
use of seasonal and trend decomposition using Loess (STL) models.
Simple Linear Regression
In the simplest case, the regression model allows for a linear relationship between the forecast
variable y and a single predictor variable x. It was intended to adjust data to a lineal, a quadratic term,
a cubic term and an exponential term. The results obtained are shown in Table 3. For TAS sensor,
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, so the sensor cannot be adjusted to a lineal regression. For other
sensors the null hypothesis can be rejected. However, the values given by the R2-Adjusted are too low
and MSE too high in the majority of cases. That means that the data cannot be fixed to the model.
Sensors 2020, 20, 3745 10 of 23
Table 3. Linear regression results.
Lineal Quadratic Cubed Exponential
TAS
R2-ajus −0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0007 −0.0002
MSE 0.1392 0.1392 0.1392 0.00035
F-statistic 0.000054 0.0034 0.0071 0.0017
p-value 0.9814 0.9966 0.9992 0.9663
TAR
R2-ajus 0.1516 0.1515 0.2462 0.1521
MSE 0.041 0.041 0.03698 5.8 × 10−5
F-statistic 742.8 371.6 453.1 745.5
p-value <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16
TFEU
R2-ajus 0.0168 0.01823 0.0541 0.01627
MSE 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.0078
F-statistic 71.93 39.54 80.28 69.68
p-value <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16
TFSU
R2-ajus 0.039 0.04154 0.11 0.04
MSE 0.75 0.748 0.6945 0.0031
F-statistic 171.5 90.97 172.9 171.8
p-value <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16 <2.2 × 10−16
ARIMA Model
ARIMA models provide another approach to time series forecasting. It is one of the most widely
used approaches to time series forecasting, and provides complementary approaches to the problem.
ARIMA models aim to describe the autocorrelations in the data. Along with looking at the time plot of
the data, the ACF plot is also useful for identifying non-stationary time series.
The autocorrelation plot, shown in Figure 4, lets us know how the given time series is correlated
with itself. For a stationary time series, the ACF will drop to zero relatively quickly, as the TAS
sensor does.
The partial autocorrelation at lag k is the correlation that results after removing the effect of any
correlations due to the terms at shorter lags. Differencing is a method of transforming a non-stationary
time series into a stationary one. This is an important step in preparing data to be used in an
ARIMA model.
As observed in Figure 4b, the autocorrelation of residual for TAS sensor shows that it is a stationary
one, so the ARMA model is used. That is to say, for the other sensors it is necessary to differentiate the
series, using ARIMA.
The auto arima tool in R allows us to improve the precision and agility of the ARIMA calculation.
The results obtained are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Estimated ARIMA models.
TAR TAS TFEU TFSU
ARIMA Model (3,1,5) (5,0,2) with non-zero mean (5,1,2) (5,1,1)
sigma2 estimated 0.01076 0.07068 0.3367 0.3367
log likelihood 3528.83 −388.69 −3522.97 −3522.97
AIC −7039.65 795.38 4981.6 7059.94
BIC −6982.65 852.39 5032.24 7104.05
Despite making use of the principle of parsimony, the high number of parameters obtained with
auto arima will require a very high computational cost that can cause problems in the implementation.
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Figure 4. Signal, autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of residuals: (a) TAR sensor. (b) TAS
sensor. (c) TFEU sensor. (d) TFSU sensor.
STL Decomposition
Time series data can exhibit a variety of patterns, and it is often helpful to split a time series into
several components, each representing an underlying pattern category. Each data point (Yt) at time t
in a time series can be expressed as either a sum or a product of three components; namely, seasonality
(St), trend (Tt) and error (et) (also known as white noise). For additive time series,
Yt = St + Tt + εt (1)
STL is a versatile and robust method for decomposing time series. STL is an acronym for “seasonal
and trend decomposition using Loess”; Loess is a method for estimating nonlinear relationships.
The STL method was developed by Cleveland et al. [38].
STL has several advantages over other classical decomposition methods [39]and handles any
type of seasonality. The seasonal component is allowed to change over time; the rate of change and
the smoothness of the trend-cycle can be controlled by the user. It can be robust to outliers (i.e., the
user can specify a robust decomposition), so that occasional unusual observations will not affect the
estimations of the trend-cycle and seasonal components. However, they will affect the remaining
component.
Therefore, the method selected to generate the temperature data is a STL decomposition method.
The selected sampling frequency is 288 samples per day. As shown in Figure 5, three vectors of data
are extracted, one that corresponds to the trend, one to the seasonality and one of random values, and
these are added by the algorithm as presented in Equation (1).
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Figure 5. STL decomposition for TAS sensor.
3.3. Virtual Scenario Description
The virtual infrastructure necessary for the creation of the dataset was formed by a VMWare
ESXi6.5 virtualization environment on which a virtual network, called internal IoT, has been defined.
This virtual network is isolated from the rest of the infrastructure networks, using the capacity of
VSwitch that this tool provides. About the virtualized environment, five virtual machines with Ubuntu
server 18.04 operating system have been created, each of them connected to the internal IoT network,
see Figure 6, so that the traffic between them is totally isolated. On one of these machines, the
mosquitto [40] broker has been installed, which centralizes the subscription of all MQTT clients and is
the place where the traffic capture is carried out with tcpdump [41]. In this last machine, the process of
deployment and provisioning of the code that implements the generation of MQTT communications
from the clients takes place. This process initializes the clients; distributes the code associated with each
node that implements the assigned time series; and initializes each node and controls its execution until
the sending of packets to the broker ends. In each of the four client nodes, a process is launched that
simulates each of the four sensors that make up each of the four refrigeration units. These processes
receive an identifier correlated with the cold unit identifier (InRow); for example, the cold unit 13
has processes 131, 132, 133 and 134, each simulating the operation of the unit supply air temperature
(TAS), unit return air temperature (TAR), unit entering fluid temperature (TFEU) and unit leaving
fluid temperature (TFSU). Each of the samples generated by the sensors is sent every five minutes to
the broker by means of a MQTT message that contains its node identifier as ClientId, once the sensor
has been connected for publication of the corresponding topic.
In the broker, through tcpdump, a capture of the traffic exchanged with the client nodes is made.
It is later written down and noted as part of the information that the clients have about the sending of
the tokens in the connection, allowing them to mark those tokens that belong to anomalous situations.
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Figure 6. Virtual scenario.
4. Dataset Generation
Although good datasets are necessary for validating and evaluating IDSs, generating such datasets
is a time consuming task. According to Bhuyan et al. [13], we present the following process of
generating DAD via monitoring seven days of the situation that occurs daily in a real environment.
The labeling of traffic as benign or malicious is done at both packet and flow levels for each piece of
traffic, with a sufficient trace size and with a concrete feature extraction presented also in this work.
DAD presents diverse sets of anomaly scenarios where abnormal traffic is statistically different from
normal traffic, when the majority of network traffic instances are normal.
4.1. Dataset Setup
As indicated in Section 3.3 within the virtual infrastructure, four client nodes have been configured
with four processes, and each process simulates a sensor by sending temperature samples to the broker.
Following the MQTT publisher–subscriber terminology, in each node there are four MQTT clients
publishing their messages (tokens) to a centralized broker. Therefore, for each of these sensors a code
has been implemented that allows the publication of MQTT messages. Algorithm 1 illustrates these
processes.
Algorithm 1 Client operation
Initialize client (clientId, topic)
Set the number of tokens, the number of waiting seconds and the pattern identifier
Create the MQTT client (brokerAddress, clientID, PERSISTENCE)
Establish connection with the broker (communication options)
for number of tokens do
Calculate temperature to send according to pattern
Post MQTT message with topic




First, the client is configured to use a clientID and publish its messages to a certain token. Later,
the client is created that indicates the broker’s IP address and the transfer mode (persistent, in this
case). Then, it is prompted for communication options and it starts sending messages (tokens) based
on the number of messages that are passed as an argument. To reflect the actual behavior of the
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infrastructure in which the temperature samples were taken, MQTT clients do not implement any of
the authentication and transfer security mechanisms between the sensors and the broker.
In order to implement the traffic anomalies, the behavior of the node can be modified in one of
the following ways:
• Interception: randomly deleting some sent packets.
• Modification: changing the temperature to be sent, without following the established pattern.
• Duplication: sending more tokens than the number initially planned.
For the calculation of the temperature to be sent, an algorithm that implements the time series
described in Section 3.2 Equation (1) has been coded. For each token, a sum computes from the
addition of three values: the seasonal pattern value of that node, the trend temperature pattern value
and a random value (that simulates the operation of the real environment). When a modification
behavior is implemented, the temperature standard value is modified randomly.
Subsequently, the confirmation of the transmission of the token and the configured time of spacing
between tokens are expected. In the replication anomaly simulation, this time is reduced randomly,
resulting in more tokens being sent than usual. In the case of the simulation of the interception anomaly,
the waiting times for sending the token must be modified to avoid timeout problems.
DAD comprises some tokens with those modifications and others without any of them. It is
labeled at packet level, indicating the type of token (normal or anomaly). A CSV document and an
XML document are used in which the following characteristics are indicated for each packet:
• frame.number: frame number in the PCAP package.
• ip.src: MQTT client IP.
• tcp.srcport: MQTT client TCP source port.
• mqtt.clientid: MQTT client identifier.
• mqtt.msgid: Token identifier or message number.
• label: 0 indicates that it is a packet without anomalies and 1 that the packet is part of a flow that
has been altered.
4.2. Capture and Structure Methodology
Through a process distributed and synchronized with a NTP server, a network of sensors is
created where the publication of samples is collected in a central broker. The capture of the packets
is carried out in the network interfaces of the node in which the broker is running. The simulation
process has various tools that allow the following operations:
• Deploy and configure the sensors in the nodes: it allows the configuration of the number of nodes
and sensors (clients) that will participate in the simulation.
• Verify the status of execution of the configuration of sensors in the nodes: it allows the verification
of the state in which each of the sensors is, in the different nodes of the simulation.
• Make the sensor operation traceable: it is also possible to track the operation of the different
sensors, recording the activity of each of them in a corresponding log file.
• Launch the execution of different processes: automation of the execution of the different processes
involved in the simulation.
• Parameterize the number of tokens to send and the periodicity of the shipments.
• Parameterize the identifier to be sent as clientId.
• Generate the sample that corresponds to the pattern of the day of the week.
• Cancel or reset the simulation at any time during the operation.
• Program its operation asynchronously.
All these samples are captured by means of a sniffer process located at the broker interfaces.
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4.3. Labeled Process
Finally, once the traffic has been captured at the broker, a dataset annotation process is performed
to identify which packets are part of flows with an abnormal behavior. This information has been
previously generated at the client nodes. The annotation process is performed using the Scapy [42]
tool. A pseudocode describing this process is specified in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Labeling
Create XML and CSV headers
for each packet in PCAP file do
if haslayer(TCP) then
Get IP address and TCP source port
end if
if haslayer(MQTTPublish) then
Get msgid, clientId and topic
if clientId in anomaly sensor then
Annotate package as anomaly
end if
Build line with f rameNumber, ipsrc,tcpsrcport,clientID, msgid, label
end if
Record information in CSV and XML format
end for
Using the Scapy tool, the different frames are traversed, obtaining the necessary data to record
the dataset, the IP address and TCP port of the MQTT client. If it is an MQTT packet, the message or
token identifier is obtained, and the client identifier indicated in the packet. Finally, those packets that
are part of streams that have been modified are marked in the label field.




DAD is a labeled dataset consisting of seven days of network activity with anomalous packets
spread over five days. It has three different types of anomalies: duplication, interception and
modification on the MQTT message. For the analysis, some traffic features have been extracted [43].
The anomaly traffic is made from InRow 13 with IP source 10.6.56.41. The anomaly has been done
in specific days of the week. The distribution is as follows:
• Monday 21st: there are no anomaly packets.
• Tuesday 22nd: some packets have been removed, so packets are not labeled as anomaly.
• Wednesday 23rd: a modification of packets is made between 4 and 6 h.
• Thursday 24th: insertion of packets in less than 5 min at 3 h.
• Friday 25th: a mix of interception, duplication and modification is done at 6 h and between the
14–16h.
• Saturday 26th: a mix of interception, duplication and modification is done at 6 h and between the
14–16h.
• Sunday 27th: there are no anomaly packets.
5.1. General Dataset Description
To know the behavior of the dataset in a generic way, some characteristics that are considered
important in the detection of traffic anomalies, such as numbers of source and destination bytes,
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numbers of source and destination packets sent, the number of packets for each protocol and also the
numbers of abnormal and normal packets by day are analyzed below.
DAD has a total of 101,583 packets. It presents UDPand TCP traffic on the transport layer and
MQTT as the IoT protocol. The 96.9% of the traffic corresponds to TCP packets, and 3.4% to UDP
traffic. The 63.3% of the total are MQTT packets and 16% of these packets are anomalies. The detailed
information is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Dataset statistics.
Day Src Bytes Dst Bytes Src Packets Dst Packets Prot_TCP Prot_UDP Prot_MQTT Pack_Normal Pack_Anomaly
Monday 699,527 348,336 9526 4905 13,936 495 9248 14,431 0
Tuesday 696,658 347,846 9491 4907 13,908 490 9184 14,398 0
Wednesday 702,714 350,844 9574 4950 14,032 492 9264 14,316 208
Thursday 703,431 351,018 9585 4953 14,048 490 9268 14,426 112
Friday 704,084 351,124 9592 4952 14,054 490 9292 14,160 384
Saturday 707,946 353,310 9645 4985 14,138 492 9339 14,246 384
Sunday 702,744 350,682 9571 4947 14,026 492 9277 14,518 0
Total 4,917,104 2,453,160 66,984 34,599 98,142 3441 64,872 100,495 1088
This table also shows that interception anomalies have not been marked. This is because the
modified packets have been removed, so their percentage cannot be reflected in the general statistic
about packets marked as abnormal. In other words, the anomalous traffic percentages do not take into
account the interception anomalies.
One of the features that provides a wealth of information in traffic analysis is the number of
packets sent by each IP address source. This information allows one to gain an insight into the
distribution of the packets over the network and predicts its behavior. The number of packets sent
from every source IP over the days is shown in Figure 7. Every IP address represents an InRow, that is,
the packets presented are the sum of the packets sent by the four sensors.
Due to its own structure, and to the publish–subscribe messaging transport qualities of the
MQTT protocol, an IoT sensor network sends all packets to the broker, and the sensors do not create
connections to each other. Besides, the largest amount of package shipping will be done by the broker.
In fact, the connections of the sensors to the broker present the same distribution as expected.
The number of packets sent, and the relationship between packets and the number of bytes
sent for normal traffic are homogeneous. The node with IP address 10.6.56.34 has a second network
interface through which it synchronizes with the NTP server. For this reason, UDP traffic from this
node does not appear, and this can be seen in the absence of some packets in the node. On the other
hand, unbalanced packet distributions on IP address 10.6.56.41 represent abnormal network behavior.





























































































































































Figure 7. Number of packets by IP source by label and by day.
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Another relevant feature is the distribution of packets per protocol. IoT introduces the need for
specialized standards and communication protocols to handle resulting challenges. At the transport
layer, TCP and UDP are the dominant protocols for most of the applications, while MQTT is the most
widely used in IoT due to its low overhead and power consumption [4]. The dataset presents UDP and
TCP protocols at the transport layer. It also presents NBNS and NTP protocols over UDP and MQTT
over TCP. Table 6 shows the number of packets on each protocol. The packets that are found in the
TCP box with blank space are packets sent over TCP only. As mentioned above, all anomaly packets
are over MQTT messages. Therefore, the other packets have normal behavior.
Table 6. Protocol composition.
Protocol Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
TCP MQTT 9248 9184 9264 9268 9292 9339 92774688 4724 4768 4780 4762 4799 4749
UDP NBNS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0NTP 492 490 492 490 490 492 492
In addition to the analysis of packets, an analysis of flows is performed. Flows are established as
unidirectional, taking an idle timeout of 30 s (typical timeout values range from 15 s to 5 min [44]).
This way, a TCP connection is divided into different flows. Each of the sensors set up a TCP
connection with the broker on a daily basis. The connection always closes the next day, so some
packets corresponding to a flow of one day will be presented the next day. The labeling of the flows
was performed a posteriori. All packets belonging to the same flow were marked as anomalies.
The general statistics on the number of flows by day are presented in Table 7. The dataset has a total
of 67,848 flows, of which 544 correspond to anomaly flows. The number of flows during the days is
homogeneous, presenting a smaller number on Sunday due to connection closures that are made the
next day. All anomalies are carried out on TCP flows.
Table 7. Number of flows.
Day Total Anomaly Normal TCP UDP
Monday 9710 0 9710 9216 494
Tuesday 9666 0 9666 9176 490
Wednesday 9748 104 9644 9256 492
Thursday 9746 56 9690 9256 490
Friday 9762 192 9570 9272 490
Saturday 9828 192 9636 9336 492
Sunday 9388 0 9388 8896 492
Total 67,848 544 67,304 64,408 3440
5.2. TCP/MQTT Description
Next, a description of TCP packets is presented. They contain the MQTT and all abnormal packets.
As can be seen in the general analysis, and due to IoT conditions, most of the characteristics present
homogeneity in their behavior. This situation led us to look for IoT features that allow us to establish
specific traits in the behavior of the network.
The MQTT payloads are extracted and grouped according to the clientId to recreate a time series
and to be able to visualize the temperature signal presented by the sensors in the dataset. Figure 8
shows the sensor signal pf both normal and abnormal traffic, over the seven days as a time function.




































Figure 8. InRow 13 sensor signals.
All InRow sensors have the same IP address, but the ports used for message transmission are
different for each of the sensors. Therefore, a total of 16 ports are used per day that are assigned
with each connection. This means that a total of 112 TCP ports are used.In each connection, the
sensors receive a token with the clientId, through a certain port, which determines the sensor identifier.
A clientId equivalence table is made allowing to know which port each sensors is using at the time of
connection. Each sensor uses one port a day and changes with each connection. This is the reason why
a total of 112 TCP ports are used.
As we know, the total traffic distribution packets are uniform, so we expect the same behavior
from clientId packets under normal conditions. The number of packets sent by day by clientId is
shown in Figure 9. As mentioned above, a first instance to detect unlabeled anomalies is the lack of
uniformity in traffic. This means that interception anomaly are detected through the absence of packets
on Tuesday. As mentioned before, some missing Sunday packages correspond to the connection
closures that are presented the next day.
















































































































































































































































Figure 9. MQTT clientId.
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Initially, all flows should be identified and labeled as normal and abnormal. A unique TCP
connection is made throughout the day, so flags are analyzed to understand the state of the connection.
The analysis of the flags was carried out to determine how the broker established and closed the
connections, as shown in Table 8. The behavior of these particular connections is due to the fact that at
the application level, it sends the disconnection message but then does not wait for the ACK flag.








Another relevant feature to analyze is flow duration, described in Figure 10. This figure presents
the behavior of the broker with IP address 10.6.51.1, an InRow with IP address 10.6.56.50 which exhibits



















































































Figure 10. Log-linear flow duration. (a) Broker. (b) An abnormal node. (c) A normal node.
Interception anomalies are distinguished by avoiding the reception of some packets. Recognition
of this anomaly is difficult, but one of the mechanisms for its identification is through the arrival time
between flows of the same sensor. Figure 11 shows a log-lineal representation of the lag duration
between flows. It presents the behavior of the broker with IP address 10.6.51.1, an InRow with IP
address 10.6.56.50 which exhibits normal behavior and an abnormal InRow with IP address 10.6.51.41.
The time-lag established in the reception between one message and the other is five minutes.
When an irruption anomaly is carried out, this time is altered, become greater than that determined by
the system, and therefore, the number of packets decreases. The appearance of duplication anomalies,
together with the interception anomalies, can make the presence of the last one difficult to detect.
However, since duplication anomalies are marked in the dataset, the presence of interception anomalies
must occur between normal flows.






























































































































































































































































































Figure 11. Log-linear duration of lag between flows. (a) Broker. (b) An abnormal node.
(c) A normal node.
The presence of flows with a duration greater than 5 min is evidence of flows corresponding
to this type of abnormally, as is shown in Figure 11. According to this, the interception anomaly is
done on Tuesday, Friday and Saturday as expected. This feature allows us to label all those flows that
correspond to this kind of abnormal behavior.
DAD allows the evaluation of anomaly detection algorithms. A set of features was selected among
the most used features in this kind of domain [30,32,45]. These features can be used for the application
of different machine learning techniques.
6. Conclusions
The huge number of devices connected to the network, and the increase of connected elements in
an IoT network, with generally limited capacity, offer a series of advantages with respect to resources,
lighter protocols, greater exchange of messages and simpler topologies. However, this greater
connectivity extends the vulnerability of the services and the possibilities to different network failures
and in the same way simplifies the anomalies in network traffic. The initial step in preventing or
avoiding network failures is to detect those anomalous behaviors in network traffic.
In this paper, we have presented DAD, a labeled IoT dataset for anomaly detection, with real
world traffic, sufficient trace size, diverse anomalies scenarios and concrete feature extraction that
facilitates testing with machine learning algorithms.
These algorithms will allow the detection of anomalies that arise from IoT devices. After a review
of the literature, we did not find a dataset that suited our needs, which motivated us to generate this
dataset, which aims to fill the gaps to our requirements (amount of traffic, correct labeling, IoT protocols
represented, capture duration, etc.) and that may be useful to other research groups, too.
In this process, real data were taken from the temperature sensors of the CITIC data center,
where we have realized that the modification of the data on IoT networks can substantially affect all the
behavior of the refrigeration system of the data center. These real data were mathematically modeled
by applying both parametric and non-parametric methods to approximate the real distribution.
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After exploring the most used techniques for the mathematical model function, time series using
STL decomposition fitted the real data better. This happened because it took distribution, past events,
stationarity and seasonality in the presented data into account.
The modeled data have been implemented in a virtual environment, which emulates five devices,
a broker and four InRows. The experimentation performed represents the real environment in a
reliable way.
Most systems for detecting traffic anomalies show the alterations on network packets. In this
case, because of the type of networks being managed, we modified to the IoT protocol payload, at the
application layer. In this specific case, the use of the MQTT protocol was selected, given that it is the
protocol most used in IoT networks.
A detailed analysis of the dataset has been reflected in this article. This fact makes DAD a versatile
dataset, easy to follow and manipulate, to facilitate the work of other research groups that want to
use it in their projects. It contains 67,848 flows and 101,583 packets. In total, 3.4% of these packets are
UDP and 96.9% are TCP. It is also important to note that the unidirectional flows and the packets were
marked. Finally, 0.8% of these flows were tagged as anomalous.
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